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Economics and particularly economic policy often seems to focus almost exclusively on the growth of income and 
creation of wealth.  However economists have always viewed Gross National Product (GNP) as an imperfect measure 
of human welfare.  Recent research on subjective well-being (happiness) consistently confirms that there are 
diminishing marginal returns to income.  Once basic material needs are satisfied, happiness responds more to 
interpersonal relationships than to income. One’s personal values and philosophy of life also matter, as do strategies 
and techniques for mood control and raising each individual’s baseline or set-point level of happiness. This paper 
briefly summarises the research findings which have led to this gradual and ongoing shift of focus.  Then we take a 
Buddhist perspective on happiness and economics.  Many of the recent research findings are consistent with Buddhist 
analysis, particularly its analysis of the conditioning process leading to unhappiness.  Furthermore, Buddhist practices 
provide skilful means for the mind to control the mood.  The paper ends, however, on a cautionary note: in what 
sense, if any, is the “greatest happiness” the Buddhist goal? 
 




The “dismal science” of economics is getting happy.  Economists have long been 
concerned with the meaning and measurement of utility, welfare and the standard and 
quality of living, hence their interest in recent developments in neuroscience which 
purport to provide objective measures of subjective well-being.  Some irony then for 
economists to discover that the empirical correlation between increases in income and in 
reported happiness is at best tenuous.  More important are relatively stable inherited 
personality traits, partly encoded in the genotype and partly assimilated during early 
childhood development.  One’s personal values and philosophy of life also matter, as do 
strategies and techniques for mood control and raising each individual’s baseline or set-
point level of happiness.  These strategies and techniques can be found in cognitive 
therapy, positive psychology and in the major religious - particularly mystical - 
traditions.  Thus economist Richard Layard (2003, 2005), surveying the burgeoning 
scientific research on happiness, advocates the Buddhist psychological practices of 
meditation.  It is the recent conjunction of economics, neuroscience, psychology and an 
ancient religious tradition which is the subject of this paper. 
 
Economics and particularly economic policy often seems to focus almost exclusively on 
the growth of income and creation of wealth.  Consumer spending, the provision of 
public services, investment by private and public sectors, and international trade 
undoubtedly contribute to well-being.  For example, wealthy people are generally more 
educated, enjoy better health, and live longer.  It is hard to imagine that people 
experiencing grinding poverty are happy.  What is true for the individual is true for 
society as a whole:  once basic needs are satisfied, further growth in national income 
opens up the possibility of expanding the range of choices open to society.  Economic 
progress, in the form of greater material prosperity, has generally been a very good 
thing indeed.  However economists have always viewed Gross National Product (GNP) 
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as an imperfect measure of human welfare.  Recently they have begun (again) to take 
happiness seriously.  And, in 2004, the Himalayan Buddhist kingdom of Bhutan became 
the only country in the world to measure its wellbeing by Gross National Happiness 
(GNH) instead of GNP. 
 
This paper briefly summarises the research findings which have led to this gradual and 
ongoing shift of focus.  Accessible and comprehensive reviews of and contributions to 
the relevant economics literature can be found in Bruni and Porta (2005), Frey and 
Stutzer (2002) and Layard (2005).  Readers particularly interested in the psychological 
basis of this research will find valuable summaries in Kahneman et al. (1999), Nettle 
(2005), New Scientist (2003), and Schwartz (2004).  The following summary of this 
research leans heavily on these excellent sources. 
 
We then take a Buddhist perspective on happiness and economics.  Many of the recent 
research findings are consistent with Buddhist analysis, particularly its analysis of the 
conditioning process leading to unhappiness.  Furthermore, Buddhist practices provide 
skilful means for the mind to control the mood.  The paper ends, however, on a 
cautionary note:  in what sense, if any, is the “greatest happiness” the Buddhist goal? 
 
Income and Happiness: The Evidence 
 
What is economic activity for?  The obvious answer is that its purpose is to generate, 
sustain and, if possible, improve human welfare.  Explaining this process is the subject 
matter of economics.  However the concept human welfare is itself elusive.  For about 
150 years, economists were utilitarians.  They subscribed to the philosophy of Jeremy 
Bentham (1789): the best society was one in which citizens are happiest, so the aim of 
policy should be to promote “the happiness of the greatest number”.  The problem was 
then and still is, how to measure happiness?  One could simply ask people how they 
feel, and many surveys of subjective well-being do just that. 
 
A typical questionnaire might ask: “On a scale of 0 (= totally unhappy) to 10 (= totally 
happy), how happy or satisfied are you with your life as a whole these days?” However 
there is an obvious problem with this approach.  Suppose that over the last ten years, 
three-quarters of society say that they have become a little happier, while the remaining 
25 percent report that they are experiencing acute clinical depression. Is society better or 
worse off?  Without any means of making interpersonal comparisons of reported 
happiness, these surveys give little practical guidance to policy-makers.  For example, 
redistributing wealth to the poor from the rich no doubt makes the first group happier 
and the second group less so.  But how far should this redistribution be taken if the aim 
is to make everyone as happy as possible?  The answer requires objective quantifiable 
information about the impact of changes in wealth on different individuals’ well-being.  
So from the 1930’s onwards, attention shifted towards a much easier, admittedly 
imperfect, measure of welfare - GNP, the sum of a country’s income or spending or 
output. 
 
Fortunately the neuroscience of happiness has progressed over the past 20 years or so.  
Measures of serotonin levels, blood flow, oxygen uptake, electrical activity in different 
parts of the brain and MRI scans all confirm a direct connection between brain activity 
and reported mood - positive and negative feelings (Davidson 2004, Urry 2004).  
Questionnaire results correlate directly with the neuroscientific measures.  Happiness is, 
in principle, as measurable as blood pressure.  Economists can begin again to take 
happiness seriously because self-reported subjective well-being is now shown to have CA/LE/313/4/3/2008  4
objective validity:  for evidence, see Coghill et al. (2003), Davidson (1992, 2000), 
Davidson et al. (2000), and the summary provided by Layard (2005). 
 
Economic analysis of the relationship between economic progress, as measured by 
GNP, and happiness, measured by average population scores from surveys, show three 
remarkably clear findings: 
 
 
¾  Over the past 50 years rich countries (e.g. US, UK and Japan) have 
become much richer; for example average real incomes have more 
than doubled.  However the evidence shows that people are on 
average no happier.  In the economics literature, this is known as 
“Easterlin’s Paradox” (Easterlin, 1974 and 1995).  Research by 
psychologists (Diener et al., 1995) and political scientists (Inglehart, 
1990) reach the same conclusion.  Figure 1 illustrates this finding.  In 
fact depression, suicide, alcoholism and crime have risen.  Happiness 
in poor countries on the other hand has increased with higher income. 
 
 
Figure 1: Income and Happiness in the United States 
 
 
Source: Layard (2005) p.30 
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¾  Rich countries are usually happier on average than poor countries.  
Obviously other things besides income determine happiness.  This 
can be seen from Figure 2.  Why is New Zealand about as happy on 
average as the US when average income in the US is almost double 
New Zealand’s?  Vietnam has half the per capita income of the 





Source: Layard (2005) p.32 
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¾  As the following table shows, within rich countries the rich are much 
happier than the poor.  However increases in income have not made 
either group any happier. 
 
 
Happiness in the US by Income (%) 
 
Top quarter of income  Bottom quarter of income   
1975 1998 1975 1998 
Very  happy  39 37 19 16 
Pretty  happy  53 57 51 53 
Not too happy  8  6  30  31 
  100 100 100 100 
Source: Layard (2003) 
 
 
All the evidence suggests that extra income certainly matters, but only when we do not 
have a lot of it.  For an individual or a society struggling to subsist, an extra dollar can 
significantly raise well-being.  From there on, the effect of extra income begins to tail 
off.  Once income per head exceeds about $20,000 (at 2005 prices), extra income 
appears to have very little additional impact on happiness.  There are diminishing 
marginal returns.  This occurs because of adaptation and social comparison. 
 
Adaptation (or habituation) is part of our human hardwiring.  Like other animals, we 
respond less and less to any given level of sensory stimulus.  An increase in income or a 
lottery win initially raises happiness.  After a while we get used to a higher material 
standard of living, and take it for granted.  Happiness falls back towards a baseline 
level, probably determined by innate personality and temperament.  In addition to 
changing our response to a given level of stimulus, we often ratchet up our expectations, 
raising our targets and aspirations as our actual standard of living increases.  If our 
satisfaction or happiness depends on closing the gap between the income we want and 
the income we actually have, we find ourselves on a hedonic treadmill, always chasing a 
moving target, and always being dissatisfied.  Whatever the cause of adaptation, some 
of the empirical evidence suggests that changes in income have a larger quantitative 
effect on the level of happiness than the level of income.  However much income they 
have, income addicts always want more. 
 
Social comparison (or rivalry) puts us on another inherently unsatisfactory treadmill.  
Once again there is strong empirical evidence that what matters for individual happiness 
is not so much our own income or consumption in isolation, but our income or 
consumption compared with that of others:  see Clark et al. (2008) for an excellent 
survey of the relevant literature. 
 
Consumption is “positional” and often deliberately conspicuous. We want to “keep up 
with the Joneses”, and ideally get ahead.  Data for the US suggests that if one person’s 
income goes up, the loss to others is 30 percent of his or her initial gain in happiness 
(Blanchflower and Oswald, 2004).  In the limit, if everyone’s income increased at the 
same rate, no-one would be better off.  Social comparison helps to explain why rich 
Americans are happier than the poor, and yet neither group seems to have been made 
much happier even though there has been sustained income growth across the whole 
country since the 1950’s.  The futile attempt by each individual to have higher income  CA/LE/313/4/3/2008  7
or consumption than everyone else puts us on a social status treadmill.  The resulting 
“income arms race” is inefficient.  People spend too much time working to achieve what 
is at best a temporary gain in relative income.  All would be happier if overworking 
were deterred.  Frank (1985, 1999, 2005) in the US, and Layard (2005, 2006) in the UK 
therefore advocate taxation on income or consumption in order to correct this inefficient 
misallocation of time.  More leisure time could then be spent investing in interpersonal 
relationships – e.g. with family, friends and within the community.  Happiness research 
consistently reveals that, once a fairly basic level of real income has been achieved, 
extra income or consumption gives very little additional happiness, compared with 
enjoying such relatively time-intensive relationships as these. 
 
Like adaptation, social comparison may be part of human hardwiring.  It has been 
suggested that our early ancestors learnt about the availability of subsistence essentials 
such as food, shelter and primitive tools by observing the possessions of their 
neighbours; also, those with better food, shelter, etc implicitly signalled their superior 
genetic fitness.  If these were indeed the original reasons for social comparison and 
rivalry, they are largely redundant today. 
 
Commonsense is confirmed by recent research:  there is more to happiness than income, 
wealth and material consumption, once basic needs are satisfied.  There is no doubt that 
our genetic inheritance and family upbringing affect our capacity to be happy as adults: 
see, for example, Lyobormirsky et al. (2005).  Then, surveying the available evidence, 
Layard (2005) concludes that there are five factors which have little or no impact on 
happiness: age, gender, our physical attractiveness, IQ, and education.  He identifies 
seven factors which research shows do have a significant impact on our well-being (the 
first five are listed in order of quantitative importance):  family relationships, financial 
situation, work, community and friends, health, personal freedom and personal values or 
philosophy of life.  The size of the marginal impact on happiness of these seven factors 
is shown in Appendix A: what is remarkable is how large a quantitative effect these 
mainly relational variables have particularly when compared with significant changes in 
family finances. A propos the subject matter of this paper, note the relative size of the 
coefficient for religious belief. 
 
One point stands out very clearly.  Because we are “social-selves”, we need to belong.  
Close relationships - in our family, with friends, at work, in our community, as 
members of a voluntary organisation or religious group - make us happy.  As well as 
providing love, support and material comfort, they define our identity - our sense of 
who we are.  These are high trust relationships, and trust between people is an important 
contributor to personal happiness.  Divorce, widowhood and unemployment have a 
significant and lasting negative impact on our well-being.  Unemployment hurts beyond 
the loss of income as social ties are broken, and rising unemployment causes insecurity 
which reduces the happiness of even those who do have jobs. 
 
Social relationships - their formation and fracture - have a more lasting impact on 
happiness then does income.  The reason is that adaptation to them is typically 
incomplete.  People never fully adjust back to their baseline level of happiness after 
getting married or losing their job.  Expectations and goals do not seem to be raised or 
lowered after these significant life events as much as they are by fluctuations in material 
circumstances.  The psychological impact of changes in social relationships which 
impinge upon our very identity are more profound than transitory hedonic stimuli. 
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Notice also the inclusion of personal freedom and personal values or philosophy of life 
in Layard’s list of the seven major factors determining happiness.  The quality of 
government matters: administrative efficiency and effectiveness, stability, 
accountability, and democracy, including democracy at the local level, all enhance the 
well-being of citizens.  And as economist Richard Layard concludes:  “Finally, and 
crucially, our happiness depends on our inner self and our philosophy of life.  [P]eople 
are happier to appreciate what they have, whatever it is, if they do not always compare 
themselves with others; and if they can school their own moods ……[H]ow we interact 
with others is equally important. …more anxiety comes from striving to ‘do well’ for 
yourself than from striving to ‘do good’ for the rest of the world” (Layard, 2005 pp. 71-
73). 
 
Based on his evaluation of the factors which most influence our well-being, Layard 
recommends appropriate policies, some of which are markedly different from current, 
orthodox economic thinking.  These are shown in Appendix B. 
 
A Buddhist Diagnosis 
 
Buddhism recognises that there is the happiness of sense pleasures - the Pali terms are 
kamasukha or samisasukha - and spiritual happiness, niramisasukha, the highest form 
of which is vimuttisukha, happiness which is independent of material things and sense 
desires.  Although “contentment is the greatest wealth” (Dhp.v.204), there is recognition 
that wealth, lawfully obtained by hard work, brings four sources of worldly happiness: 
economic security, having enough to spend generously on oneself and others, the peace 
of mind that accompanies freedom from debt, and the peace of mind of knowing that 
one has earned one’s wealth blamelessly (A II, 62).  This sort of worldly happiness is 
attained through skilful endeavour, protecting one’s savings, having trustworthy 
associates, and living within one’s means (A IV, 281 and 285). 
 
As we have seen, in wealthy, developed economies happiness has not increased in spite 
of very large increases in income.  No doubt part of the reason is because there have 
been simultaneous offsetting trends in depression, crime, mistrust and family break-up.  
Some might want to add the pervasive influence of increased hours spent watching 
television: an alleged reason for the decline of community life and for creating wants by 
commercial advertising.  Others might put the blame on moral erosion due to increased 
individualism and, outside the US, declining religious belief.  Materialism breeds 
discontent:  Nickerson et al. (2003) show that “the more important people believe 
financial success is, the more dissatisfied with both work and family life they are” 
(Nettle 2005, p. 152).  Clark and Lelkes (2005, 2007), Helliwell (2003) and other 
researchers have evidence that religious behaviour is positively correlated with 
individual life satisfaction, when controlling for other possible influences.  Besides the 
utility from expected afterlife rewards that individuals derive from religious practice, 
religion may act as a buffer against stressful life events, for example unemployment and 
divorce, and religious affiliation can be an important source of social support.  In their 
study of 20 European countries, Clark and Lelkes (2007) show that religious behaviour 
in a region has positive spillover effects, enhancing the well-being of both those who 
are religious and those who are not. 
 
There are, as previously explained, two other reasons not due to external causes.  The 
pursuit of income and consumption is unsatisfactory in itself because of eventual 
adaptation and social comparison.  Trapped on hedonic and social treadmills, we over-
invest our time in paid work and associated commuting, at the expense of building and CA/LE/313/4/3/2008  9
maintaining valuable relationships with family and friends, and within the wider 
community.  Clearly many of our choices - what to buy, how many hours to work - 
often do not bring us happiness. 
 
The starting point for a Buddhist analysis of the “happiness problem” is the starting 
point of the Dhamma, the Buddhist world-view, itself:  dukkha (suffering, 
unsatisfactoriness) and its cause.  Its proximate cause is tanha, strong desire or craving.  
Its root cause is avijja, ignorance.  Here I shall focus specifically on ignorance in the 
following sense: as not understanding through experience and insight what from the 
Buddhist perspective are the three fundamental characteristics of existence - 
impermanence, unsatisfactoriness and selflessness or emptiness - and dependent 
origination.  In a nutshell, suffering arises through attempting to sustain a mistaken 
identity built on attachment to transitory mental and physical phenomena.  The process 
by which this comes about is dependent origination.  This is described in Appendix C; 
the non-standard terminology sometimes used is that of contemporary authors and my 
own, hopefully to bring greater clarity to a process which the Buddha himself described 
as deep and difficult to penetrate with the intellect alone.  
 
Ignorance, a fundamental and pervasive cognitive deficiency, conditions and is manifest 
in our kamma formations - our  “inherited forces” (Collins 1982, p.202) or core 
“operating system”, in particular our habitual drives and tendencies. These habitual 
drives in turn propel our awareness/discernment (Harvey, 1995) into a discriminating 
mode (Sucitto, 1991. p.9) that operates in terms of the “conceptual and formational 
blueprint” which is our experiential individuality (Hamilton, 1996, Ch. 6).  This 
“blueprint” determines our sensory functioning, in particular the way we process and 
interpret sensory data. Phenomena are therefore discerned as existing on one side or 
other of the “sense doors” (Sucitto, 1991, p. 9); that is, as “I”, subject, and “other”, 
object.  
 
Sensory stimuli give rise to varying degrees of pleasant or unpleasant feelings.  These 
feelings stimulate desire (or its opposite, aversion), which grabs the attention - or, more 
accurately, the attention grabs and attaches to the desire. Layard (2005, p.189) observes 
that “[i]n psychological jargon the problem is one of ‘framing’ - by focusing on one 
particular desire or feeling we give it excessive salience”.  We identify with the desire.  
Personal aims and obsessions develop (Sucitto, 1991, p.10), reinforcing the sense-of-
self.  This motivates intentional choices and actions (cetana).  However as the original 
stimuli inevitably cease so too do the associated feelings.  Only the motivational energy 
of the self remains.  These choices, now lacking any sustainable rationale, inevitably 
lead to disappointment, depression and dissatisfaction. 
 
This process is repeated moment-to-moment and endlessly as long as ignorance persists, 
i.e. as long as cognitive errors, conditioned responses to stimuli, and self-deception 
remain unrecognised and unchallenged. 
 
There are remarkable parallels between the conditioning process of dependent 
origination and recent findings of psychologists researching happiness.  These are 
summarised schematically in Appendix D.  Anything from 50 percent (Lyubormirsky et 
al. 2005) to 80 percent (Lykken and Tellegen, 1996) of the interpersonal variation in 
long term subjective well-being can be ascribed to inborn temperament, character and 
ability to overcome setbacks.  Both personality and happiness show temporal stability, 
with happiness certainly responding to life events in the short run, but eventually 
reverting towards the individual’s set-point on account of adaptation (Costa and McRae,  CA/LE/313/4/3/2008  10
1980, Costa et al. 1987, Magnus et al. 1993).  We have also inherited a basic survival 
programme of seeking pleasure and avoiding pain.  But pleasure is not the same as 
happiness.  Different brain chemicals drive desire and pleasure on the one hand, and 
happiness on the other.  Dopamine and opioids are involved in pleasure, wanting and 
desire.  Serotonin is involved in well-being and happiness. 
 
Nettle (2005) argues that human behaviour is driven by desire, and that evolution has 
made us desire things that are generally good for our (early ancestors’) fitness (e.g. 
status and material resources).  These things may make us happy, or they may not.  
Evolution has also given us a “strong implicit theory of happiness. ……[W]e come to 
the world believing that there is such a thing as achievable happiness, that it is desirable 
and important, and that the things we desire will bring it about.  It is not self-evident 
that any of these are actually true.  The idea of happiness has done its job if it has kept 
us trying.  In other words, evolution hasn’t set us up for the attainment of happiness, 
merely its pursuit” (Nettle, 2005, p.168).  Even when desires do bring happiness, at the 
very moment of their fulfilment the pleasure of anticipation and the excitement of the 
pursuit disappear. 
 
We therefore pursue income and status at the expense of more valuable relationships, 
programmed also, it would appear, to mispredict adaptation and social comparison 
(Nickerson et al., 2003).  When assessing our current well-being we make unnecessary, 
erroneous comparisons with past experiences of happiness, with future goals and 
expectations, and perceptions of the happiness apparently enjoyed by others.  Memories 
of past relevant events are often biased, focusing on peak happy or unhappy 
experiences, or on more recent experiences of happiness.  This can lead to over-
estimating how much happier achieving the things we want will make us.  Or we pass 
up opportunities which would actually make us happier because of attachment to the 
status quo.  The ultimate cognitive error is the self-deception of defining our identity by 
what we earn and consume, or in terms of our relationship with others.  The social-self 
too is a manifestation of deeply ingrained cognitive errors.  On the one hand this leads 
to the frustration of social comparison.  On the other, attachment to this identify results 
in the large lasting losses of well-being reported when significant relationships collapse. 
 
From a Buddhist perspective, aiming to achieve “the best” from this process of 
dependent origination is quite literally self-defeating.  Better to settle for what is “good 
enough”.  Again psychology confirms the wisdom of this advice.  Schwartz (2004) 
studies the happiness of maximisers, for whom only the best will do, and satisficers who 
are content with whatever meets predetermined criteria and standards.  Maximising is 
seen to be a source of great dissatisfaction.  Maximisers are more vulnerable to regret 
from comparison with imagined alternative possible outcomes, and to status: “the only 
way to be the best is to have the best”.  The more alternatives available the more 
difficult is maximisation.  And, as Schwartz (2004, p.101) says: “every choice we make 
is a testament to our autonomy, to our sense of self-determination”.  However the more 
bounded, unique and independent is our sense of self, the more we tend to take personal 
responsibility and blame ourselves for failure to make the “right” choice.  One 
consequence of economic progress is an expanded range of possible choices.  On the 
one hand this has the potential to enhance individual autonomy; on the other the 
problems of making a choice increase, along with the psychological cost – the regret of 
missing out on a larger number of forgone opportunities. 
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The Buddhist Cure 
 
There is no shortage of books by Buddhist authors on how to develop happiness:  see, 
for example, H.H. Dalai Lama and Cutler (1998), and Ricard (2003).  Layard (2005, 
ch.12) provides a brief overview. 
 
The purpose of the Buddhist agenda can be summed up in two words: stop suffering.  
To the extent that suffering, in the sense of unsatisfactory conscious experience, is 
internal and conditioned, meditation is central to Buddhist practice: the aim is to train 
the mind so that ultimately the process of dependent origination ceases.  Mindfulness 
meditation is a noticing practice, “being the knowing” rather than automatically 
identifying with moods, feelings, etc.  Simple techniques are used to calm the mind and 
sharpen the awareness or attention.  The various components of dependent origination 
can then be observed more objectively, in detail, and with increasing refinement.  Just 
observing sensory contact, feelings, desire and aversion, attachment and framing, and 
obsessions as they arise and pass away reduces their continuity and connectedness.  
Gradually mindfulness practitioners are able to come off autopilot, letting go, for 
example, of ingrained comparisons between perceptions of their present situation with 
memories of the past and expectations and goals for the future.  More fundamentally, 
direct observation reveals that all phenomena are transitory, potentially unsatisfactory 
and empty of self.  These insights reprogramme our “core operating system”, purging 
our “Windows on the World” of the deep cognitive errors which infect our “conceptual 
and functional blueprint”.  It leads to the cessation of suffering. 
 
Mental health professionals are increasingly applying mindfulness techniques in the 
clinical domain, teaching these methods to patients experiencing clinical depression, 
anxiety, chronic pain and other problems – see Gerner et al. (2005) and Segal et al. 
(2002).  “The core skill to be learned is how to exit (step out of) and stay out of … self-
perpetuating cognitive routines.  The bottom line is be mindful (aware), let go.  Letting 
go means relinquishing involvement in these routines, freeing oneself of the 
attachment/aversion driving the thinking patterns – it is the continued attempts to 
escape or avoid unhappiness, or to achieve happiness that keep the negative cycles 
turning.  The aim of the programme is freedom, not happiness, relaxation, and so on, 
although these may well be welcome by-products” (Segal et al., 2002 p.91, their italics).  
Davidson et al. (2003) show that an additional benefit of mindfulness meditation is an 
improvement in the immune system. 
 
Another strand of Buddhist meditation cultivates four unconditional and unlimited 
positive mind-states (brahma-viharas): loving kindness, compassion, enjoyment of 
others’ success, and equanimity.  Combined they are characterised by a concern for the 
welfare of all without discrimination; being unenvious; the elimination of aversion and 
acquisitiveness; objectivity towards oneself and others equally; and taking responsibility 
for the consequences of one’s actions.  This is the stuff of mood control, by which one 
develops a positive attitude towards oneself and others, and resilience to fluctuations in 
one’s own fortunes.  The brahma-viharas have the therapeutic benefit of promoting 
subjective well-being; at the deeper level of insight, they erode a concept of self which 
is bounded, independent and permanent. Maximising, doing the best for ourselves, is 
recognised as a pointlessly frustrating strategy in an inherently imperfect world.  Better 
to settle for what is “good enough”, and work to ameliorate the suffering of all. 
 
Genetic determinism and hedonic adaptation together suggest that any gains in 
happiness are short lived, as well-being reverts inevitably to its set-point.  Such a CA/LE/313/4/3/2008  12
pessimistic view is challenged by the concept of neuroplasticity, that the brain 
physically responds to experience and in particular to training, so that a sustainable 
positive change in happiness is possible  (Eriksson et al. 1998, Goleman 2003, 
Lyubormirsky et al. 2004, Rilling et al. 2002).  Buddhist meditation practices have been 
shown to have this neurological effect (Davidson et al. 2003, Lutz et al. 2004).  Though 
there is no supporting neurological evidence, it is well established that there is also a 
positive correlation between altruism and happiness (Diener and Seligman 2002, Layard 
2005 Annex 8.1, Seligman 2002, Sheldon and Lyubormirsky 2006).   
 
In the context of the happiness literature one should also note the positive benefits of 
morality, another cornerstone of Buddhist practice.  Adherence to the Buddhist lay 
precepts – not killing, stealing or lying, and refraining from sexual misconduct and 
alcohol and drug abuse - means that we can trust others, and others can trust us.  Trust is 
the glue which holds relationships together.  It enhances well-being.  Schwartz (2004, 
p.112) points out that the rules by which we live have a further value.  Constraining 
behaviour in some areas may reduce the scope of our autonomy, but it also simplifies 
and lifts the onus for making complex decisions, for example “how much of our life we 
devote to ourselves and what our obligations to family, friends and community should 
be”. 
 
A Cautionary Conclusion 
 
From a Buddhist perspective there is nothing wrong with economic progress, unless it 
stimulates attachment and greed.  On the contrary, if it serves to alleviate suffering it is 
welcome.  An excellent explanation of Buddhist economic ethics is provided by Harvey 
(2000, ch. 5).  In a nutshell, there is no particular merit in poverty; indeed poverty is 
recognised as a cause of crime and other immorality.  Rather, the traditional teaching is 
that current prosperity is a mark of past generosity.  What matters is how wealth is 
earned, how it is spent, and how we relate to it. Wealth, lawfully obtained by hard work, 
brings four sources of worldly happiness: economic security; having enough to spend 
generously on oneself and others; the peace of mind that accompanies freedom from 
debt; and the peace of mind from leading a blameless life. 
 
Dependent origination gives a generic account of why we suffer.  Its explanation of why 
income and wealth provide only temporary satisfaction and why, even so, we spend so 
much time and effort trying to accumulate even more, is consistent with recent findings 
in psychology and economics.  Buddhist meditation practice provides techniques for 
overcoming these self-defeating strategies, and, like other therapies, has the potential to 
raise baseline or set-point levels of subjective well-being.  
 
All of which would be uncontroversial if Buddhism were just one more therapy.  The 
Dhamma however offers skilful means not just of improving psycho-physical 
conditions but of realising the unconditioned. Layard (2005, p.12) puts it concisely: 
happiness is “feeling good” - a pleasant but transitory feeling, good to experience in the 
moment but foolish to cling to.  Happiness can certainly arise in meditation practice, 
and is an indispensable condition for attaining concentration of mind.  Similarly the 
modern concept of “flow” (Csikszentmihalyi, 1990), absorption into the task at hand, 
whatever the task is, brings a deep sense of enjoyment.  Concern for the well-being of 
all sentient beings, without limit, is an indispensable characteristic of the brahma-
viharas.  Nevertheless, happiness, in the sense in which we have used the word 
throughout this paper, is not the ultimate goal of Buddhism.  The cessation of suffering 
is. A bodhisattva is a saviour-being: the bodhisattva’s vow of compassion is to free all CA/LE/313/4/3/2008  13
sentient beings from suffering, not to make them happy.  Buddhism could therefore be 
viewed as a form of negative utilitarianism (Keown, 1992, Ch. 7). 
 
Final liberation from suffering only comes about with the full and complete realisation 
of Nirvana, and the ending of further rebirth.  Nirvana is sometimes described as the 
highest happiness, but happiness here does not refer to sense pleasures.  How it 
manifests in consciousness is not described, “but just as cognition in this state is more 
intuitive and holistic and less differentiated, it is clear that the feeling is something like 
a calm, disinterested, undisturbed satisfaction” (Johansson, 1969, p.26).  Nirvarnic 
happiness, unconditioned and unconditional contentment, is the culmination of a life in 
which the person fulfils from a Buddhist viewpoint their true potential, the good life, 
akin to Aristotle’s eudaimonia (Keown, 1992, p.199).  It cannot be conceived as 
Bentham’s hedonic balance of pleasures and pains, though as we have seen, an 
emerging sense of well-being in the sense usually studied by psychologists and 
described by Nettle, (2005, p.17) as a hybrid of emotion, and judgements about 
emotion, may be a happy by-product of progress along the Buddhist Eightfold Path. 
 
Postscript from an Economics Nobel Laureate 
 
Should happiness be the goal? 
 
There are many different and plausible ways of seeing the quality of living. 
 
“You could be well off, without being well. 
You could be well, without being able to lead the life you wanted. 
You could have got the life you wanted, without being happy. 
You could be happy without having much freedom. 
You could have a good deal of freedom, without achieving much.” 
A. Sen (1987), p.1. 
 
The problem is adaptation again.  Preferences change and can be changed. People can 
be manipulated.  In Aldous Huxley’s Brave New World, people take soma to make 
themselves feel happier.  Protesters were quickly sprayed with soma, not CS gas. 
 
In the UK, fluoride is added to the water supply because it is good for our teeth.  
Suppose Prozac were soluble and there were no adverse side effects.  Should it be added 
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  Fall in happiness (points) 
Financial situation   
Family income down by a third  2 
Family relationships   
Divorced (rather than married)  5 
Separated (rather than married)  8 
Widowed (rather than married)  4 
Never married (rather than married)  4.5 
Cohabiting (rather than married)  2 
Work   
Unemployed (rather than employed)  6 
Job insecure (rather than secure)  3 
Unemployment rate up 10 percentage 
points 
3 
Community and friends   
“In general people can be trusted”   
Percentage of citizens saying yes down 
by 50 percentage points 
1.5 
Health   
Subjective health down 1 point (on a 5-
point scale) 
6 
Personal freedom   
Quality of government   
Belarus 1995 rather than Hungary 1995  5 
Personal values   
“God is important in my life”   
You say no to this rather than yes  3.5 
 
Source: Helliwell (2003), Layard (2005) p. 64 
 




Rethinking Economic Policy 
 
1.  The development of happiness should be monitored as closely as the 
development of income. 
 
2.  Income should be redistributed towards where it makes the most difference (the 
poor within developed countries, and towards the Third World). 
 
3.  Self-defeating work should be discouraged by suitable taxation. 
 
4.  Income comparisons and the zero-sum struggle for rank and status should be 
discouraged.  Instead, motivation should be an adequate general level of pay, 
and by stressing the importance of the job, professional norms and  professional 
competence. 
 
5  The costs of too much geographical mobility - increasing crime, weakening 
families and communities - should be recognised and addressed by policy-
makers. 
 
6.  High unemployment should be eliminated, and secure work should be promoted 
by welfare-to-work and reasonable employment protection. 
 
7.  Activities that promote community life should be subsidised. 
 
8.  To improve family life, more family-friendly practices at work should be 
introduced (e.g. more flexible hours, more parental leave, easier access to  child 
care). 
 
9.  Dysfunctional advertising, which escalates wants, should be limited.  In 
particular, commercial advertising to children should be prohibited. 
 
10.  Participatory democracy should be actively promoted. 
 
11.  Mental health should receive a much higher priority. 
 
12.  Better education is needed, including moral education.  “We should teach the 
systematic practice of empathy, and the desire to serve others ….  The 
curriculum should also cover control of one’s own emotions, parenting, mental 
illness … and citizenship.  But the basic aim should be the sense of an overall 
purpose wider than oneself.” (Layard, 2005, p. 234). 
 
  Source: Layard (2003, 2005) 




Dependent Origination: Paticca-Samuppada 
 
Dependent on is/are 
  
ignorance, avijja inherited  forces
(1),
 habitual drives and 
tendencies, kamma formations, sankhara 
  







the “conceptual and functional blueprint” 




“the blueprint”, nama-rupa “sensory  functioning”,  salyatana 
  
“sensory functioning”, salyatana sense  contact,  phassa 
  
sense contact, phassa feeling,  vedana 
  
feeling, vedana desire,  tanha 
  
desire, tanha attachment,  framing
(5), upadana 
  
attachment, upadana  personal aims and obsessions
(2), bhava 
  






(re)birth, self-consciousness, habit 
reinforcement, jati 
“the cycle of maturing and passing away, 
with the resultant sense of sadness, 
varying from sorrow to depression, to 








(1) Collins,  (1992) 
(2) Sucitto  (1991) 
(3) Harvey  (1995) 
(4) Hamilton  (1996) 
(5) Layard  (2005) 
 
 




The Dependent Origination and Psychology of (Un)Happiness 
 
The Set-Point: Up to 80% of Happiness is Genetically Inherited 
or Assimilated in Early Childhood 
 
Ignorance → Habitual Drives & Tendencies → Discernment → 
The Identity “Blueprint” → Sensory Functioning 
 
 
1.  A wrong theory of happiness 
 
•  Happiness exists, is achievable and sustainable 








•  Desire  ↔  dopamine, opioids 
•  Happiness  ↔  serotonin 
 
 
2.  A mistaken self-view / personal identity 
 
•  Self belief 




•  Mispredict adaptation, social comparison 
•  Compounded by maximising behaviour 
•  Attachment to the status quo/loss aversion 
•  Other cognitive errors, e.g. biased memories 
 
 
All of the above are superimposed upon a basic survival programme: 
 
Sensory Stimuli → Pleasant/Unpleasant Feelings → Desire/Aversion → 
Attachment/Revulsion → Intentional Choices 
 
 
Summary: choices based on defective human hard-wiring often turn out to be 
unsatisfactory. 
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